Did U.S. aid win hearts, minds in Afghanistan?

Over the past decade, U.S. military expeditions have increasingly used development aid to undermine popular support for insurgents and extremist groups, and pacify turbulent areas. But does this tool work in conflict zones like Afghanistan?

My new research published in the American Political Science Review provides evidence that aid spending by the U.S. military in Afghanistan in many cases produced violent backlash from insurgents against troops and civilians.

Aid distributed in districts under the control of coalition forces reduced violence. But aid distributed in contested districts actually increased the level of violence carried out by insurgents against both civilians and the U.S. military.

To test how aid projects affect insurgent violence, I examined 5,936 projects in Afghanistan during 2008-2010 under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which provided development aid funds to U.S. military commanders to use in their local area of operations. I also looked at more than 46,000 security incidents reported by an independent nongovernmental organization network and 30,000 incidents reported by the U.S. military.

From 2012 to 2013, I spent seven months in Afghanistan, carrying out dozens of interviews about the patterns of violence in the country.

With much of the funds directed to contested areas, the net result in Afghanistan was that areas that received CERP projects saw a significant increase in violence, at least in the short term. I estimate that the close to $100 million in completed projects spent in contested districts during 2008-2010 resulted in 33 additional bombings against civilians and troops, 20 additional insurgent actions against U.S. troops and 57 additional improvised explosive device (IED) incidents against U.S. forces.

In contrast, aid-related spending in controlled areas probably prevented six civilian bombings, 18 enemy actions and 18 IED events from 2008-2010.

Congress has approved more than $5 billion in CERP funds to date in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines, with minimal oversight and unclear strategic guidance for operators. In Afghanistan, the CERP program peak of $1 billion in a single year corresponded with the start of President Obama’s “civilian surge” in 2010. Thousands of CERP projects were completed during the decade, including canal digging, humanitarian aid and security infrastructure in government buildings.

Interviews with commanders in the field have confirmed that these projects were undertaken with little guidance or oversight. Military operators, reflecting on CERP, reported that in general they viewed this funding as a potentially useful tool, but one that has not yet been harnessed well.

The bottom line from my evaluation is that “hearts and minds spending” is indeed capable of reducing violence against both civilians and U.S. forces – but only when it targets areas already under the control of friendly military forces. In other areas, it may instead backfire.

This story was originally published January 10, 2017 at 5:01 AM with the headline "Did U.S. aid win hearts, minds in Afghanistan?."