Print edition: 
Although few people believe that a balanced-budget constitutional amendment can actually pass, the cruel deception that it could solve the nation's debt problem clouds the political atmosphere and limits imagination and progress.
It's time to recognize that there is no silver bullet to slay the fiscal werewolf. We need to get on with the tough, responsible give-and-take that is required for Congress and the White House to regain, over time, enough control to govern effectively.
Our Constitution outlines in the broadest terms how the federal system works. It contains few numbers, is by design remarkably flexible, and assumes that underlying comity and good intentions will prevail despite strong partisan passions. Amending it is a complex process for good reason, and we should do it precisely and with foresight and caution.
A balanced-budget amendment violates those criteria, for at least three reasons.
* It would need to define exactly and in detail what constitutes a balanced budget, and that's unwieldy and impossible. One need only review the arguments surrounding any year's federal budget to be reminded of the gimmicks, the hide- and-seek, the distortions and clashing assumptions that accompany each one. Multitrillion-dollar budgets are by necessity complex contrivances based on projections of costs and revenues that may or may not develop. Making a federal budget appear balanced is easy, and demonstrating that it's not is even easier.
* It would destroy the constitutional tripartite balance of powers, the core of our system, and would strip citizens of their only leverage, their votes.
That's because no proposed amendment specifies how it would be enforced. Since arguments over whether a budget is truly and honestly balanced are endless, a constitutional requirement of balance would make resolving the argument the province of the federal court system, raising two critical problems.
Timing: The president proposes a budget to Congress around Feb. 1 to take effect Oct. 1. At any point in that process, lawsuits could be filed by members of Congress and other citizens and interest groups. Typically it takes two or three years to get a case to the U.S. Supreme Court, and there likely would be thousands of cases annually, many frivolous. Thus we could never be sure that any budget actually met the constitutional requirement until it was far too late.
Power: In resolving the conflict, federal judges would have the unwanted power to decide how to balance it — what to cut and what revenues to raise. As lifetime appointees, they would be beyond the reach of citizens or Congress if their decisions were unacceptable or inadequate. The primary power of the legislative branch — the purse — and the primary power of citizens — the vote — would be nullified.
* It would leave the most crucial fiscal decisions in the hands of congressional minorities, a profoundly undemocratic idea. Even if, miraculously, no lawsuits arose, the nation could be impotent to deal with emergencies. If, for instance, a worldwide recession cut into revenues or costs soared, such as in a Katrina-like disaster, operating out of balance would require approval by a supermajority of each house, such as two-thirds, meaning a minority of one-third plus one could stop anything. If you think that wouldn't be a problem because people in Congress surely would act responsibly and not out of ideology or ignorance in an obvious crisis, you weren't paying attention last week as less than 15 percent of the House of Representatives paralyzed that body while the nation hurtled toward default and collapse.
A balanced-budget amendment is unworkable, unwise and unsafe.
