Trudy Rubin: U.S. needs strategy for handling Karzai

The re-election of Afghan President Hamid Karzai creates new headaches for the Obama administration. But it also presents opportunities to be seized.

The August election was rigged; the dragged-out recount was a farce. A runoff scheduled Saturday was canceled after Karzai's opponent withdrew, saying the process was too corrupt.

But Karzai's victory by default offers the Obama administration an opening to do something it should have done months ago: devise a strategy to prevent Karzai from wrecking any chance of stabilizing Afghanistan.

Arriving in Kabul last week, I could see Afghans had wearied of the election process. The campaign posters of August were long gone, and few Afghans I spoke to had planned to vote.

Yet this tainted election has huge implications for Afghans and Americans. Whichever strategy President Obama finally adopts will require a competent government in Kabul. We have no such partner now.

U.S. military and civilian officials have prepared an alternative, bottom-up strategy that would focus on helping local and provincial officials. Such a strategy holds promise in a country with a history of weak central government. But Karzai can thwart it by appointing corrupt officials to provincial and local positions.

A prime example: Kandahar province, the birthplace of the Taliban, where U.S. troops are trying to roll back a resurgence of militants. They are being undercut by Karzai's younger brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, the kingpin of the province, who has reputed links to the drug trade and control over appointments to key jobs.

President Karzai thumbed his nose at Obama's call last week for "a new chapter" in the fight against corruption, saying he would launch an anti-corruption campaign but wouldn't fire key officials. He did say he would strengthen a weak anti- corruption commission, something Obama is demanding. But what use is a commission when Karzai won't clean his own house?

When Karzai errs, Afghans often blame the foreigners who back him. "People see the international community and the government as two sides of the same coin," said Shahmahmood Miakhel, chief of party for the U.S. Institute of Peace's Kabul office, which deals with rule-of-law issues.

How, then, to persuade or pressure Karzai to change policies that undermine both countries? Here are some suggestions I've heard from senior U.S. military officials, U.S. civilian advisers and knowledgeable Afghans:

Obama must personally convince Karzai that we are serious about corruption.

The administration must speak with one voice. The CIA reportedly pays Ahmed Wali Karzai for some services. Cancel the contract. "You cannot do anti-corruption if Ahmed Wali is on your payroll," said one U.S. adviser in Kabul.

Insist that any new development funding for Afghanistan be subject to fiduciary oversight, possibly by a distinguished international panel.

Some heads must roll among corrupt Karzai allies as a prelude to a new system of appointing cabinet and provincial officials. If Ahmed Wali Karzai remains in power in Kandahar, we'll know nothing is changing.

After an election that displayed all of President Karzai's flaws, we must use the leverage that billions in aid should give us. Otherwise, we're pouring money down the drain.

Trudy Rubin is a columnist for the Philadelphia Inquirer.